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LAWRENCE KIMMEL 
 
JOURNEYS HOME: THE PATHOS OF PLACE 
 
I 
 
The pathos of place is elemental in grounding the risk of life, the source of confidence requisite 
to the human quest whether it is conceived as arche or telos, whether it is where one begins, or 
the end toward which one’s journey is directed. The project of living is such that one’s journey is 
always toward a homeland, however it be conceived: dreams of homecoming, the recovery of 
innocence, the joyful receiving of the retrieved prodigal, the triumphal march of the heroic 
legions, the quiet return of the native – all hopeful to appear once again in the light of 
recognition, of acceptance, of victory, to the acknowledged communion of belonging. The 
perceived cycle of life, a full and human life, is such that one always returns home, whatever its 
name. If one cannot go home again, one always looks homeward. With luck, effort, intelligence 
and imagination – features without which Greek philosophy found no life human – one finds a 
way home, to the arche and telos of place, and discovers those boundaries within which the 
passion of human achievement is realized. 
I do not offer these remarks in place of, or as backed by, statistical summary or empirical 
claim. There are those, of course, who never look back (or for that matter ahead), those who have 
neither memory and longing, nor dreams, and more tragically, those for whom the very idea of 
place is a recurring or permanent nightmare or anathema. There is, further, a danger in the 
philosophical employment of a ubiquitous and vague concept like “home” that one may be drawn 
into the sentimental sludge of popular misuse, where “home” is a greeting card catalogue of 
homilies for feelings that never were – improbably Sunday school slogans for sainthood. One can 
be sensitive to this danger without conceding that a grounding place is, for that reason, beyond 
philosophical reach, or beneath philosophical interest and inquiry. The categories of “home” and 
“homeland”, in the variations of their meaningful use, are such fundamental references to place, 
and so crucial to cultural community and individual identity, that we ought not to abandon the 
topic, despite its popular dispersion and hyperbolic abuse. 
In this paper, I will give a short account of the tension between time and place as defining 
structures of human life. The fundamental intuition, familiar in Greek philosophy, is that human 
life is achievement of place, not merely birthing in time. 
There are problems with any attempt to put conditions on human life beyond “born of 
woman”, with seeking to define human life in terms of quality and character, in terms of moral 
excellence rather than biological commonality. For example, if an individual fails to achieve 
some level of life deemed to be human, is it permissible to regard her as not due the rights, 
privileges, considerations of that station? Is such a creature to be treated then as ... what –an 
animal, an object, subject only to the efficiency of use? May we inflict experimentation 
procedures on her body, mind control trials on her spirit? The answer is, of course not. But this, 
in fact, is still a matter of negotiating guaranteed rights; it can hardly depend on natural 
disposition, as we well know from 20
th
 century episodes in uncivilized history. 
 
A–T Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana XLIV, 163–171.  
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I will hold such concerns as prima facie legitimate, but set them in the background for the 
present paper. The worry is, of course, that any definition of the human not bound by the 
imperative of natural boundaries is an offense not easily corrected by laws of ascribed rights, is 
pre–judicial against the sympathy of species kinship and not recoverable through reasoned 
judgment. But that is part of the ordeal of human civility itself. Even so, in the present essay I 
will proceed to set out conditions of place resonant with time, requisite to an understanding of 
the human. It may be that ours is a time well served by a moral redescription and reaffirmation of 
human life as an achievement requiring effort. Human life, the Greeks well understood (and in 
this understanding began the history of moral philosophy), requires a human world. HuMan is 
not merely a creature and plaything of time, but an agent and creator of place. 
 
II 
 
Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt come to mind immediately as contemporary philosophers 
who consider the category of place elemental in the constitution of both the human condition and 
the human project. This may at first seem odd in the case of Heidegger, for his own major 
interest in Being centers in the category and phenomenon of time. But the point to be understood 
is just here. The essential way in which we are human is being-in-the-world; human-being 
defines place in the world in a way uniquely different from other kinds of beings. The human 
being is in the world in the manifold senses of being in Europe, – en route, in prison, in mind, in 
memory, in ill repute, in love, in doubt, in error, in want of, indicted under, involved with, 
incapacitated by.... These are all ways of being in the world, place markings different in kind, but 
framed within language, which itself houses human sensibility and keeps open, through metaphor 
and imagination, a place for possibility. So conceived, philosophical inquiry brings into focus 
once again the concept and context of Being, an account founded in the self–presencing of 
human–being as reflective inquiry into its place in the complex order of things. 
Heidegger’s now familiar key words for this human way of being are “dwelling” and 
“concern”. HuMan discovers and creates a defining place through the labor of her body and the 
work of her hands – labor which sustains life, work which builds worlds. The kinds of works 
which frame the human place are manifold: houses, gardens, gaols, courts, temples, but also 
books, plays, war, law, dreams, recollection, and hope; projects of making and doing, of practice 
and theory. Arendt, following the work of her teacher, Heidegger, performs an analytic of “place” 
in The Human Condition, locating her analysis in the conceptual polis of Periclean Athens. Her 
work, directed at the arche of western intellectual history, provides a fundamental politics of 
place compatible with and in the spirit of Heidegger’s ontology of place. Heidegger’s Being and 
Time gathers the categories of time and place into correlative features of human existence. If life 
(bios) in its most primitive character is being in time (movement), certainly the history of culture, 
following the Greeks, has defined human life (as bios politikos) in the additional terms of being 
in place. 
 
III 
 
In the United States there currently exists a social category at crisis point: “the homeless”, a 
designation which seemingly describes alien creatures dispossessed of place; a deprivation which 
not only functionally erodes their participation in public life as citizens, but excludes them from 
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the simple amenities of human community. In a land of plenty this is typically presented as a 
social misfortune or political outrage, but for our purposes this estrangement marks a loss of 
something more essential, an estrangement from fundamental elements of human identity as well 
as community. Whatever the reasons, which are manifold and complex – economic and personal, 
biological and social, elective and enforced – it is philosophically significant that we use 
“without home” as an entitlement of alienation and exclusion, a category below or beyond that of 
mere poverty, signifying persons cut off from human community, who lack the basic conditions 
under which “human” is defined and defended. 
The dispossession of place is an ontological as well as a social problem. This idea is as old as 
Greek philosophy, where Aristotle defined “Man” as a political animal, a creature in need for his 
very being of the polis or human community. The shared language and form of life of the human 
is bounded by the walls of this place, which provides for disclosure of unique individual identity 
in a space of appearance, the public realm of one’s community. The broader concept of one’s 
homeland (Greek: “kome”, village; “homoios”, same; Latin: “Homo”, Man) appears in a 
definitive way in the familiar long journey home of Odysseus. Similarly, in the Hebraic tribal 
conception of home, the homeless exile, Ishmael, is the “unwanted of God”, destined to wander 
apart from the spiritual community of God and Man. 
It is difficult to imagine a category more fundamental than “home” to house the biologically 
nurtured, socially emergent sense of the human. The collateral analogues of home are inclusive 
of the phenomenology of place: of body, womb; of world, mother earth; of action and event, 
encompassing horizons and embracing sky; of hope and transcendence, the domain of the 
possible, of night and stars and gods, shoring up in space the sustaining sea which gives forth its 
primal issue – all carry the primal force and spiritual weight of “home”. The myriad fictive and 
real, metaphorical and factual locations, in time and place, of home, are found in cloister and 
hearth, in the heart or the mind. Home may be lost in childhood, in settlements east of Eden, 
constituted in kinship, restored in friendship, decided in marriage, discovered in children, 
temporarily secured in family, invested in community, realized in the sovereignty of a people. 
“Home” is a primary category of an essential place in time, isolated or integrated, whether 
remembered in tears amid alien fields of corn, in the shattered ruins of a city laid waste by war, in 
memory ravaged by age, in fantasy invited by desire, in faith restored by love. 
 As we have pictured it here, the human is a convergence of time and place. The former is 
defined by and constitutes the root of the natural; the latter signals the emergence of culture, the 
convening of civilization. The long ordeal of civility is made possible only on condition of an 
escape from cycles of life under the weight of natural necessity, an escape from the immanent 
imperative of survival. The first-order activity of animal life in response to the conditions under 
which life is given is the labor of survival. The primal life cycle, still under the yoke of necessity 
was, according to the forming thought of Greek philosophy, not yet human. Where Homo is 
subject to the fundamental condition of contingency, the cycle of life in nature is that one must 
labor/to get food/to eat/to gain strength/to labor/to get food/to eat ... ad infinitum.  Under the 
most primitive conditions of the natural life cycle, the total energy and activity of being must be 
committed to sheer survival, to sustaining life in time, life not yet at rest, secure, or empowered 
with freedom in place. 
Only when the natural cycle of necessity has been broken to create leisure, at least for a few, 
when labor is sufficiently coordinated to meet and overcome the ubiquitous burden of survival 
through development of surplus, and so allows for some privileged members to escape the 
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binding cycle of “labor to live/live to labor”, is there a possibility of moving from process to 
product, of creating through work the identity and permanence of place. Work is thus a second 
category of fundamental activity in response to the human condition, a movement from the 
natural metabolism of the bios of labor, “the labor of our bodies”, to the productive activity of the 
poiesis and techne of work, “the work of our hands”. The activity and result of work, issuing in 
works, creates world, the place in which human action becomes possible in its disclosure. 
Arendt, following Aristotle, frames the form of fully human life as requiring the place of 
human community, the polis. Not in the boundless time of labor, but in the place of work, can 
there be a production of world, and with it security, permanence and freedom – the boundaries of 
meaning within which civilization develops. Arendt’s third category of definitive activity in 
response to the human conditions of natality, plurality, contingency and scarcity is action. Only 
when individuals are free from the necessity of labor and the utility of work is virtue or 
excellence possible. The telos of action (praxis) is self-disclosure through great words and deeds 
among a community of equals, who in their freedom enshrine such action in the remembrance of 
history. The identity of individual and community are transformed in a moment or a life. Such 
deeds and words remembered become history, achieve immortality. Thus public place, through 
the endurance of works and the remembrance of acts, shapes the identity of a people, and forms 
the substance of civilized existence that we call human life: Ilium and Athens. 
 
IV 
 
There remained, in the complete Greek description of human life, a further transcendent concept 
of place which was unchanging, and a way of human life and activity of mind which gave access 
to this place of the timeless, of eternity. This way of life – not open to everyone – the life of the 
mind, was philosophy: noesis for Plato, theoria for Aristotle. Aristotle’s contemplative life, 
critically mirroring Plato’s notion of transcendence without the notion of the Eides or Forms, 
develops the notion of “home” in transcendence to eternity. If praxis (action) can achieve 
immortality through words and deeds of lasting memory, the discourse of philosophy is one of 
eternity. Plato and Aristotle share the idea of transcendence, but with a very different sense of the 
continuing importance of place. Plato is clearly committed to the idea of a transcendent place, an 
ideal realm of enlightenment, a place in the sun where the Eides appear intelligibly visible to the 
mind which has made the dialectical journey. Aristotle seems to hold to the idea of the public 
realm as definitive of place. The vita contemplativa, the life of the mind, while no longer in an 
essential or necessary way dependent on shared place, requires no separate place or realm of the 
Forms. For Aristotle, presumably, the mind is its own place, although not in the sense of Milton’s 
Satan. The latter would introduce an entirely different realm of meta–phorical place which we 
have no time to pursue in this paper. In the classical Greek life of the mind, one discourses with 
the gods themselves, or at least joins the eternal conversation pitched in the language of the gods. 
The transcendental difference is that the idealist Plato speaks of the timeless in the idiom and 
metaphors of place, and Aristotle, paradoxically perhaps, of the timeless in the idiom of time. 
Differently stated, for the realism of Aristotle there is but one world, one grounding place, and no 
reflection removes one from it. 
 
V 
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Even before the formal grounding of philosophy in the logos of place, the mythos of Greek 
culture had formed the ground of place in the primal emergence of meaningful life. Prior to its 
philosophical appropriation, one can read the text of Greek mythology (e.g., Hesiod) in such a 
dually interpretive way that its “task” portrays the struggle of both the cultural and cosmogonic 
overcoming of chaos. The lesson is not merely the ontic ordering of the cosmos, but a modelling 
constitution for human community. In the primal stuff, gathering forces move ponderously 
toward the intelligibility of place. In the mythic development of language (of place, things, 
permanence, of the works of mind and hand), the domain of the human strives to overcome the 
devouring primal conditions of change (time). So seen, human civilization is the overcoming of 
time with place, the securing of a realm free of the destructive first conditions of life. 
In the mythic story of time beginning, there emerges from the primal conditions of Chaos and 
Moira (Destiny), the grounding possibility of the privileged First Ones of Place (and so of 
meaningful life); the feminine Gaia (Mother Earth), from whom, in yearning (Eros, desire and 
need of completion, space between), is born the masculine embracing boundary of Uranos 
(Father Sky). We can, herein, tell only the first few words of this long story: His-story and Her-
story – the tense yearning of conflict and completion, of human time and place, of world and life 
– the fabric of immortality which shrouds the mortal animal HuMan. As the mythos develops, the 
ensuing union of Gaia and Uranos produces Kronos (Time) who – with the fertile urging of 
Earth, caught in the passion of her nature to birth life – wields the Scythe, weapon of his calling, 
and prevails against the rule of the father. Time thus ascends to hold male dominion, but in 
betrayal of Earth, swallows the offspring of the resourceful Mother. A final battle definitively 
frames the constituting values of Greek and Western civilization. The new generation, Zeus and 
the Olympians, Earthborn of Time, through an exercise of political rationality faithful to the 
Earth, join forces to subdue and diminish devouring Time, thus establishing for themselves an 
Olympian community above time and change, one removed from the cyclical destruction of the 
natural and temporal. It is from this life form of the gods that the race of men descends. 
 These are mere beginning words in the continuing conversation of literature and culture, 
stories through which we try to come to an understanding of ourselves, in which Being articulates 
its own meaning, becomes conscious through poiesis, the genius of poetry and language.   
 This story – both mythos and logos – can be read in many ways, of course. I am suggesting 
that it presents and represents a primal expression of the pathos of place. It is through the 
overcoming of time primal enemy of the God in Man – and the creation of place, that the shape 
and space of human community, immortality, and eternity are opened into civilized life. Thus 
wrought, the City of Men and the City of Gods, the highest form of human life and community in 
action (praxis) and also the highest form of human life and transcendence in thought (theoria), 
find expression in philosophy, mythology, history, and literature. 
 
VI 
 
Once upon a place in time: the journey home. 
The modern temper is arguably one of radical dislocation – not time “out of joint”, but time 
out of place. So being, it is not difficult to accept the poetic vision of the human situation as 
tragic. The burden of intelligent, reflective life is the consciousness of time, grains of sand 
flowing away, fragmented dreams blowing in the wind. HuMan is thus a creature caught between 
the boundaries of natality/fatality; the brief journey of her life is womb to grave, the prospect 
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only of earth to earth. We rise up and fall, strive to mark our brief passing in the flickering space 
of life. Though heavens open up to imagination and aspiration, mandarins only brush the fading 
portrait of genius upon a failing wind. 
From the epic journey of Odysseus to the ironic journey of Bloom, the voices of the blind 
poets merge, the heroic and pathetic meet and endure in a human space wrought by memory and 
language. Two images of place, of hope and dread, press upon contemporary consciousness. The 
first, an image of hope, the open beckoning of place: E.T., left behind, pointing a long crooking 
finger toward a cold if promising infinity of space, speaking plaintively to strangeling earth 
children who, nevertheless, understand very well the word “Home!” The second, an image of 
dread, the closed beckoning of place: two hapless creatures waiting for Godot, who sum up the 
dislocation of their lives in a throw away line “They give birth astride a grave”. 
 Hope and dread mark the space of human time between the two definite and defining 
structures of place. The deep ambivalence of the journey home – aspiring to freedom, fraught 
with anxiety, remembering the familiar securing foundations of structure, forgetting the 
complaining constraints of place – is always with us. The civilizing ordeal continues. To what 
end? Only to the beginning. If human life has meaning, it is in the reconciliation of time and 
place, the convergence of arche and telos. If wisdom is that which we properly seek, the ergon or 
characteristic activity of HuMan, then it consists in closing the circle of the journey home. On the 
matter of wandering and recognition, the many otherwise divergent texts which inform our lives 
agree: philosophy and mythology, politics and art, history and psychology, religion and science. 
 
We shall not cease from exploration  
And the end of all our exploring  
Will be to arrive where we started  
And know the place for the first time. 
– T. S. Eliot, Four Quartets 
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